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Tunneling through Inter-corporate Loans: The China Experience 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates a particularly brazen form of corporate abuse, in which 
controlling shareholders use inter-corporate loans to siphon billions of RMB from 
hundreds of Chinese listed companies during the 1996 to 2006 period.  We document 
the nature and extent of these transactions, evaluate their economic consequences, 
examine factors that affect their cross-sectional severity, and report on the mitigating 
roles of auditors, institutional investors, and regulators.  Collectively, our findings 
shed light on the severity of the minority shareholder expropriation problem in China, 
as well as the relative efficacy of various legal and extra-legal governance 
mechanisms in that country.   
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I. Introduction 
Traditionally, the focus of the agency literature in the U.S. has been on the conflict 
between firm managers and a diffused group of shareholders (e.g., Berle and Means 
(1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976)).  However, more recent studies show that 
well dispersed ownership is relatively rare outside of the U.S. and Japan, and that 
large block holders control most European and Asian companies.1 In this broader 
setting, the central agency problem is the risk of controlling shareholder expropriation 
of minority investors, a phenomenon commonly referred to as “self-dealing” 
(Djankov et al. (2008)) or “tunneling” (Johnson et al. (2000b)).     
 
Although anecdotes of tunneling abound, the exact nature and scope of these activities 
are difficult to pin down.  These difficulties stem from the many varied, and often 
subtle, ways that controlling shareholders can extract private benefits from the 
companies they run.2  Perhaps because of these problems, economists usually 
measure the impact of tunneling indirectly, either through the price paid for corporate 
control, or from changes in firms’ market valuation around specific events.3 While 
these studies have clearly established the existence of tunneling, they offer fewer 
specifics on how it is conducted, and why certain governance mechanisms designed to 
curb the problem might fail to deliver.  
 
                                                        
1 Studies that examine corporate ownership structure in Asia and Europe include: La Porta et al. (1999), 
Claessens et al. (2000), Claessens et al. (2002), Faccio and Lang (2002), Faccio et al. (2001), and 
Johnson et al. (2000a).   
2 For example, prior studies have discussed such activities as advantageous transfer pricing to parties 
related to the controlling shareholder, executive perquisites, excessive compensation, loan guarantees, 
directed equity issuances, dividend policies, favorable lending terms, and outright theft of corporate 
assets (See Shleifer and Vishny (1997), La Porta et al. (1999), Johnson et al. (2000b), Faccio et al. 
(2001)).    
3  Prior studies estimate tunneling from the premia paid for controlling shares (Zingales (1994), Dyck 
and Zingales (2004), Nenova (2003), and Atanasov (2005)); or from the market reaction to related 
party transactions (Bae et al. (2002), Baek et al. (2006)) or earnings (Bertrand et al. (2002)) within a 
commonly controlled business group; or from the relative price declines of firms with differing 
ownership structures during the Asian Crisis (Lemmon and Lins (2003)).   
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In this study, we investigate a particularly brazen form of tunneling that was widely 
practiced among Chinese firms during the 1996 to 2006 period.  Specifically, we 
examine the use of inter-corporate loans by controlling shareholders to siphon funds 
from publically listed companies.  Inter-corporate loans are a useful instrument for 
this purpose because they are traceable through public sources, and do not require a 
“fair value” test, such as would be needed in other asset transfers between related 
parties.  By examining the origination and settlement of these loans, we can directly 
document tunneling flows to/from controlling block holders and their surrogates.   
   
The Chinese stock market is well suited for a study on tunneling for several reasons.  
First, by virtue of heritage and design, all Chinese listed firms have a dominant/ 
controlling shareholder.  Second, the trading of controlling shares in China are 
highly restricted, thus limiting the ownership benefits of price appreciation to the 
controller, and increasing her incentive to obtain benefits through other channels.  
Third, the legal system in China offers few options for minority shareholders to take 
private enforcement action against block holder misconduct.  Fourth, public 
enforcement, including fines and prison terms for tunneling, has been hampered by 
the limited authority of security market regulators.  For these reasons, modern day 
China is an environment highly conducive to tunneling behavior.  
 
Our empirical analyses proceed along two lines.  First, we document the scope of the 
problem, and assess its cross-sectional determinants and economic consequences.  
Second, we analyze the efficacy of legal and extra-legal mechanisms (including 
auditors, market participants, and regulators) in addressing this particular form of 
insider abuse. 
 
Our results show that during 1996 to 2006, tens of billions in RMB were siphoned 
from hundreds of Chinese firms by controlling shareholders.  Typically reported as 
part of "Other Receivables" (OREC), these loans are found in the balance sheets of a 
majority of Chinese firms and collectively represent a large portion of their assets and 
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market values.  In our sample, OREC balances averaged 8.1% of total assets (5.4% 
of market capitalization, or 15.9% of the value of total tradable shares4).  For firms 
in the top decile, OREC averaged 32% of total assets (21% of market capitalization, 
or 60% of the value of total tradable shares).   
 
Using a hand collected sample, we trace a substantial portion of these loans (between 
30 to 40% of total OREC in the top three deciles) directly to controlling shareholders 
or their affiliates.5  Unlike related lending by Mexican banks (La Porta et al. (2003)), 
these loans were not made as part of the Chinese firms’ normal course of business.  
Most of these loans did not accrue interest, and even when some interest was accrued, 
neither the interest nor the principal were typically ever paid back.6   
 
We show that ORECTA (Other Receivable scaled by Total Assets) balances are larger 
for small firms (SIZE), more levered firms (LEV), less profitable firms (ROA), 
non-state-owned firms (STATE), and firms registered in regions that are less 
economically developed (MARKETIZATION), suggesting that the private benefits of 
insider tunneling are more likely to outweigh the costs in these firms.  Among firms 
controlled by SOE’s, tunneling is more severe for local-government controlled firms 
(LOCAL) than for firm controlled by the central-government (CENTRAL), again 
suggesting that net incentives for tunneling are greater among LOCAL SOE’s.  
Finally, consistent with prior market-price-based studies (e.g., Claessens et al. (2002) 
and Lemmon and Lins (2003)), we show that the OREC problem is most severe when 
the block holder’s controlling right (C) is much larger than her ownership right (O).  
That is, firms in which the controlling shareholder enjoys the lowest cash flow 
                                                        
4 Tradable shares are the shares allowed to be traded on stock exchanges, and available to regular 
investors.  On average, approximately 35% of all shares outstanding are tradable shares.  
5 This figure almost certainly understates the magnitude of the related-party portion of OREC, as many 
of the affiliates cannot be easily identified with the controlling entity.  The problem is exacerbated by 
the pyramidal structure of Chinese listed companies, which can obscure related party relationships (see 
Fan et al. (2005)).   
6 Later, we describe in detail how the practice of tunneling through inter-corporate loans finally ended 
in December 2006 after a long series of government rules and directives (see Appendix 3).  
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ownership rights (i.e., firms with large C/O ratios) also have the largest ORECTA 
balances.  This result is robust after controlling for all the other determinants of 
tunneling. 
 
We also document significant negative economic consequences for the shareholders of 
firms with high ORECTA balances.  Companies with large ORECTA balances 
exhibit worse future operating performance, both in terms of lower accounting 
rates-of-return and higher likelihood of entering financial distress.  After controlling 
for current ROA, we find that the level of ORECTA is the single best predictor of next 
year’s ROA.  In addition, we show that high ORECTA firms are far more likely to 
acquire ST (Special Treatment) status in the future.7  Specifically, 14% of the top 
decile ORECTA firms attain ST status in two years, compared to an average of less 
than 2% in the bottom 2 deciles firms.  Ancillary tests indicate that although 
profitability and tunneling severity are negatively correlated, the causality is mainly 
unidirectional (i.e. sharp increases in tunneling precedes significant profitability 
declines, and not vice versa). 
 
Further tests indicate that market participants do not seem to fully anticipate these 
negative consequences.  We find that the market uses a higher implied discount rate 
in valuing the earnings of High-ORECTA firms, suggesting a general awareness of the 
problem.  However, we also find that high-ORECTA firms earn lower risk-adjusted 
returns in the subsequent 12-months, indicating that the negative implications of these 
loans are not fully incorporated into prices.  A hedge portfolio that sells the top 
decile ORECTA firms and buys the bottom decile earns over 1% per month over the 
next 12 months.  This result is robust to the inclusion of a variety of risk controls. 
 
                                                        
7 Market regulators assign ST status to any firm that has had two consecutive annual losses (or whose 
book value is negative).  ST stocks are “on probation” and operate under various trading and financial 
restrictions.  If they report one more annual loss, trading will be suspended; a fourth loss will result in 
delisting.  Because Chinese firms rarely go into actual bankruptcy, ST status can be regarded as a 
comparable measure of financial distress. 
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We also provide some evidence on why various legal and extra-legal governance 
mechanisms might have been inadequate in containing this practice.  First, we show 
that institutional ownership is a relatively small part of the Chinese market landscape, 
a fact that likely contributes to the persistence of the mispricing.  The average 
ownership by mutual funds in our sample is only 1.33% of total shares outstanding 
(2.8% of tradable shares).  As of the end of 2004, ownership by all institutional 
investors, including Mutual Funds, Social Security Funds, and Pension Funds, is only 
3.75% (8.26% of tradable shares).  Interestingly, we find that institutional ownership 
is highest among low ORECTA firms, suggesting these institutions tend to avoid 
owning high ORECTA firms.  Evidently these investors do take ORECTA balances 
into account when selecting stocks, but their collective effect on pricing is limited.8   
 
Second, we examine the mitigating role of auditors.  Allen et al. (2005) suggest that 
a weak auditing profession is at least partially to blame for the relatively sluggish 
growth of China’s Listed Sector.  We find, however, that auditors in China play an 
active monitoring role.  Firms with high-OREC balances are far more likely to 
receive a qualified opinion – in fact a full 45% of the firms in the highest ORECTA 
decile received an unclean opinion in the reporting year.  Unfortunately, firms 
receiving a qualified opinion in one year exhibit no tendency to reduce their OREC 
balance in the following year.  This evidence is consistent with the view that when 
private enforcement channels are weak or unavailable, disclosure alone is not enough 
to curb insider abuse.9 
 
Finally, we report on the constraints that market regulators in China operate under.  
We show that a string of security regulations issued between 2001 and 2006 (see 
Appendix 3) were largely ignored, primarily because market regulators had no 
                                                        
8 Short-selling is not allowed in China, which further limits the ability of informed investors to 
discipline the price of high ORECTA firms. 
9 For good discussions on alternative approaches to the regulation of tunneling activities, see La Porta 
et al. (2006) and Djankov et al. (2008). 
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jurisdiction over the controlling entities (which themselves were typically unlisted).  
It took a joint statement by eight government ministries, threatening public disclosure 
and personal action against top management of the controlling entities, to finally stop 
the abuse.  This unusual show of political resolve finally resulted in the repatriation 
of most of the remaining OREC balances – which, even as late as 2006, amounted to 
close to 50 billion RMB, and involved over one third of all listed stocks. 
 
Overall, our findings provide a portrait of the nature and severity of the tunneling 
problem in China, and new insights on why existing legal and extra-legal governance 
mechanisms were inadequate to contain this practice.  Our evidence shows that in 
certain settings, public disclosure alone is not enough – i.e., when minority 
shareholders have no legal recourse and when security regulators have limited 
jurisdiction over the controlling entities, even an extremely transparent form of 
tunneling can persist for many years.  These findings have implications for the 
literature on the regulation of insider abuse (e.g., Djankov et al. (2008) and La Porta et 
al. (2006)).  Specifically, they argue for increased legal, rather than extra-legal, 
regulatory measures in curbing Chinese insider abuse. 
 
Looking ahead, we note that the tunneling problem in China has stubborn roots.  
Although this specific form of abuse has been eradicated, the incentives that gave rise 
to the tunneling are largely intact (in fact, recent reform has increased the C/O ratio of 
most Chinese firms, potentially exacerbating the problem).  Until these root tensions 
are more fully addressed, insider tunneling will pose an on-going challenge to reform 
in China.  In the mean time, we believe researchers interested in understanding 
managerial and investor behavior in China would do well to keep the tunneling 
perspective in mind. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides a review of 
related research as well as background information on the Chinese stock market.  
Section III presents our empirical analysis, and Section IV concludes with a 
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discussion of the implications of our findings. 
 
II. Literature Review and Institutional Background 
II.1. Private Benefits of Corporate Control 
The value of controlling rights over corporate resources has come to play a central 
role in modern thinking about finance and corporate governance.  Early theoretical 
work by Grossman and Hart (1988) has evolved into a substantial literature under the 
euphemistic label “private benefits of control” (Hart (1995), Zingales (1994)).  In 
fact, the extensive literature on investor protection and its role in the development of 
financial markets (e.g., La Porta et al. (2000)) is focused on the problem of insider 
tunneling and its containment in international settings. 
 
A number of prior studies have estimated the magnitude of these private benefits 
through the premia paid for voting rights (Zingales (1994), Nenova (2003), Dyck and 
Zingales (2004), and Atanasov (2005)).  The estimates from these studies range 
widely, but are often in the order of 25% or more of the value of firms, particularly in 
countries with less developed capital markets.10  Another approach is to infer 
tunneling by linking ownership structure to prices paid in related party transactions, or 
changes in firm equity value under special settings.11   
                                                        
10 Zingales (1994) show that in Italy private benefits of control are substantial and can easily exceed 
60% of the value of non- voting equity.  Nenova (2003) measures the value of corporate voting rights 
in 18 countries and shows that much of the variation can be explained by the legal environment, law 
enforcement, investor protection, takeover regulation, and corporate charter provisions.  Dyck and 
Zingales (2004) estimate the private benefits of control across 39 countries and find that higher private 
benefits of control are associated with less developed capital markets, more concentrated ownership, 
and more privately negotiated privatizations.  Atanasov (2005) use mass privatization auction data 
from Bulgaria to show investors will pay substantially more for a controlling stake. 
11 Bae et al. (2002) use evidence from mergers by Korean business groups to show that acquisitions 
prices tend to enhance the value of other firms in the group, to the detriment of minority shareholders.  
Bertrand et al. (2002) use earnings data on Indian business groups to show evidence consistent with 
tunneling by the largest shareholder within the group.  Finally, Lemmon and Lin (2003) document a 
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Compared to prior studies, our approach has certain advantages and limitations.  By 
using a direct measure of tunneling that is independent of firm value, we are able to 
gauge the prevalence of the phenomenon across all listed firms (not just firms with 
particular ownership structures or within related business groups).  We are also able 
to provide much more detail and color on how tunneling is actually accomplished, as 
well as conduct more detailed tests, including asset pricing tests, on the causes and 
consequences of tunneling.  Finally, because our measure of tunneling is reported at 
regular intervals, we are able to evaluate the response of various parties (such as 
auditors, institutional investors, and market regulators), and thus infer something 
about the efficacy of alternative governance mechanisms.     
 
The main limitation of our approach is that we only examine one particularly form of 
tunneling.  Compared to the control premium literature, for example, which provides 
an estimate of the total maximum private benefits for control, our evidence provides a 
minimum direct measure of tunneling.  Our measure is more interpretable as clear 
evidence of tunneling, but the magnitude of the overall problem is almost certainly 
greater than our estimate.  Therefore, while prior evidence establishes a “ceiling” for 
the total economic impact of tunneling, our evidence establishes a “floor” for Chinese 
firms.  Our point is that, even with this minimal estimate, the scale (and reach) of the 
tunneling problem in China is impressive, and merits further study.   
 
II.2 Salient Features of the Chinese Stock Market 
Chinese stock market is conducive to tunneling for several reasons.  First, all 
Chinese listed firms have a dominant shareholder.  In the early 1990s, under a 
“partial privatization” initiative, the Chinese Government allowed state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to sell a minority portion of ownership to private investors.  This 
led to the creation of China’s two stock exchanges: Shanghai (in 1990) and Shenzhen 
                                                                                                                                                               
relation between ownership structure and the decline in firm value during the Asian financial crises.   
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(in 1991).  By the end of 2004, the number of listed stocks reached 1,377 with a total 
market capital of 3,706 Billion RMB.  Most of these firms are carve-outs or spin-offs 
from an existing state-owned enterprise (SOE), in which the original SOE retains a 
substantial block holding.  Indeed, the Chinese government has been explicit in 
requiring that control of these listed companies not be relinquished.12   
 
Second, the trading of block shares is highly restricted.  During our study period, 
common stocks in China were classified into two groups: tradable or non-tradable 
(also called negotiable vs. non-negotiable). 13  Shares owned by all levels of 
governments, state agencies (such as universities), and other legal entities, are 
non-tradable.  The rest of the shares are sold to individual citizens and institutional 
investors, and are tradable.14  As of February 2005, non-tradable shares accounted 
for 63.51% of all outstanding stock.  Approximately 70% of all non-tradable shares 
were held by state-owned enterprises.  
 
Third, minority shareholders have few private channels through which to take actions 
against insider misconducts.  Courts in China have had a long tradition of protecting 
State interests and have little experience with private plaintiff-driven litigation (Allen 
et al. (2005), MacNeil (2002)).  At the same time, Chinese listed firms face few 
external governance mechanisms (such of takeovers or other forms of investor 
activism) that might deter block holder misconduct.  Institutional ownership, 
particularly by mutual funds, is also low among Chinese firms, thus limiting the 
                                                        
12 In our sample, the percentage of shares controlled by the largest shareholder for the median firm is 
42.6%; the inter-quartile range is 29% to 58%.  In the summary section we discuss the Chinese 
governments expressed intent to retain control of listed firms, particularly in key industries. 
13 Prior to 2005, all block shares are non-tradable.  In July 2005, the Chinese government announced 
a policy aimed at eventually converting these restricted shares into tradable shares.  This initiative is 
part of a broad reform program that will take years to implement.  Later, we discuss why this initiative 
is unlikely to fully resolve the agency problems that lead to tunneling in China. 
14 The tradable shares are further subdivided into Tradable-A shares, which are publicly traded among 
domestic investors, and foreign (B, H, and N) shares.  B-shares are available to foreign investors and 
are traded on the two domestic exchanges, whereas H and N shares have an overseas listing.  In this 
study, the market price of a listed company refers to the price of its Tradable-A shares. 
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disciplining effect of these investors on share prices.   In addition, as we illustrate 
later, the public enforcement mechanism in China is constrained by the limited 
authority of security market regulators.   
 
In sum, the confluence of: (1) highly concentrated ownership structures, (2) limited 
ownership benefit for block holders from price appreciation, and (3) absence of legal/ 
extra-legal mechanisms to curb block holder abuse, have together created an 
environment in modern China that is highly conducive to tunneling.  
 
II.3 Other Related Studies 
Our study is also related to recent studies that examine corporate governance and 
earnings management in China.  Several papers have documented weaknesses in the 
country’s legal and financial system (e.g., see Liu (2005), Allen et al. (2005), Fan et al. 
(2007), Cheung et al. (2006)), and the mitigating effect of regulatory changes (Bai et 
al. (2003), Berkman et al. (2005)).  A consistent theme is that better corporate 
governance is valuable in China’s emerging economy, and improvements in 
governance are rewarded in market valuations.  A second group of China studies 
have explored the effect of ownership structures on earnings management in Chinese 
firms ((Liu and Lu (2007), Chen et al. (2003), Peng et al. (2006), Jian and Wong 
(2006)).  Several of these studies document a phenomenon called “propping”, in 
which the controlling shareholder instigates favorable asset-related transfers, so as to 
meet key performance targets stipulated by market regulators.   
 
We believe the economics of tunneling provide an important organizing framework 
for interpreting these results.  Controlling shareholders will sometimes “prop up” the 
earnings of a firm through favorable asset transfers, precisely because such actions are 
needed to facilitate and sustain long-term tunneling.  In the absence of tunneling 
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incentives, such costly forms of earnings management are difficult to understand.15  
Similarly, much of the governance literature is only understandable in the presence of 
tunneling risk.  Improved governance is highly valued in China precisely because of 
the real and imminent threat of insider abuse, and the dearth of other effective 
enforcement mechanisms.  Again, it is tunneling that helps us to understand these 
findings.  In short, our study helps to make sense of earlier results by demonstrating 
the importance of adopting a tunneling perspective when studying managerial 
behavior in China.   
 
Problems with loans to related parties are, of course, not unique to China.  In the 
United States, a landmark tunneling case involved credit facilities from Adelphia 
Communications to members of the controlling Rigas family.  In Australia, 
inter-corporate loans helped to facilitate the building (and later undoing) of the Alan 
Bond empire.16  During the Asian crisis, many firms that experienced the worst price 
decline made related party loans (Lemmon and Lins (2003)).  Similarly, when 
Mexican banks lend to firms controlled by the banks’ owners, the lending tends to 
take place on better terms but are more likely to default (La Porta et al. (2003)).  We 
show that insiders’ use of inter-corporate loans to siphon funds reached unprecedented 
proportions in China.  We examine the causes and consequences of this phenomenon, 
and why various governance mechanisms failed to fully mitigate the problem. 
 
                                                        
15 In fact, both Jian and Wong (2006) and Liu and Lu (2002) find that the pattern of earnings 
management observed among Chinese firms is consistent with an abiding desire to facilitate and sustain 
long-term tunneling.   
16 See Van Peursem et al. (2007) for a detailed analysis of both the Adelphia and Bond cases. 
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III, Empirical Analysis 
III.1 Sample Description 
Our sample consists of 1,377 public companies, listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges during the period 1996 to 2004. We use the CCER China Stock 
Database, provided by SinoFin Information Services, to obtain fundamental variables, 
price and returns information.  To be included in our sample, a company must have 
been listed for at least one year, and have filed the necessary financial information 
required for our analysis.  Collectively, as of the end of 2004, our sample of 
companies represents 85.6% of the total listed firms (85.2% of the total market 
capitalization) in China.17 
 
Table I presents some descriptive statistics for our sample. In total, we have 7,557 
firm-year observations. Chinese firms all have December year-ends, and the financial 
information for year t is based on fiscal year-end t-1 financial reports.  Panel A 
reports the log of total assets (SIZE); market capitalization as of the fourth month 
after the fiscal year end in millions of RMB (MV); the total market value of tradable 
shares (TMV); the book-to-market ratio measured four months after the fiscal year 
end (BM); total leverage, defined as total liabilities divided by total assets (LEV); 
return-on-assets, defined as pre-extraordinary income divided by total assets (ROA); 
the percentage of shares controlled by the largest shareholder (BLOCK); other 
receivables in millions RMB (OREC); as well as other receivables deflated by market 
capitalization (ORECMV), tradable market value (ORECTMV), and total assets 
(ORECTA)..  All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.18 
 
Panel A shows that the average market capitalization for our sample is 3.15 billion 
                                                        
17 Throughout the paper, market capitalization (MV) refers to the value of tradable shares multiplied 
by total shares outstanding, both tradable and non-tradable.  TMV refers to the market value of the 
tradable shares alone. 
18 All key results are robust to alternative winsorization techniques, including cross-sectional 
winsorization each year, winsorsizing the entire sample, and no winsorization. 
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RMB (approximate 381 million US dollars, using the prevailing exchange rate of 8.27 
during our sample period). Most of these firms traded at a multiple of 2.5 to 5 times 
book (BM), and had reported ROA's of between 1% and 6%. Of particular interest is 
that most had substantial "Other Receivables" on their balance sheets (ORECTA) – 
the inter-quartile range for this variable is between 1.7% and 10.8% of total assets 
(2.6% to 17.5% of tradable market value).  As expected, the largest shareholder 
controls a substantial portion of these firms – the inter-quartile range for the BLOCK 
variable is 29.2% to 58.2%. 
 
Panel B reports year-by-year statistics for ORECTA. This panel shows that Other 
Receivable as a percent of total assets has been on the decline over the sample period.  
As we show later, the decline coincides with a concerted campaign by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to reduce these loans.19  Nevertheless, 
even by the end of 2004, the median firm still reported an "Other Receivable" balance 
representing 2.4% of total assets.  By definition, these loans are not part of ordinary 
business transactions, and a casual survey of the financial footnotes show that they are 
typically made to related parties, often associated with the largest shareholder. 
However, this account also can contain miscellaneous receivables from parties not 
immediately identifiable with the controlling block holder. 
 
Appendix 1 presents a case study that illustrates the problem. The HANQI Group is 
the largest shareholder of FENG HUA, holding a bit less than 30% of its shares.  
From early 2002, the HANQI Group (including its subsidiaries HANQI Real Estate, 
and Beijing HANQI) “borrowed” large amounts of money from FENG HUA. 
Appendix 1 contains excerpts from FENG HUA's financial statements. To gain a 
sense for the magnitude of these borrowing, on December 31, 2002, HANQI’s share 
of equity in FENG HUA is RMB 116.21 millions. On that date, it and its subsidiaries 
borrowed from FENG HUA a total of RMB 198.6 millions. FENG HUA never 
                                                        
19 Appendix 3 shows that the CSRC tried to curb these practices as early as 2001, but its early efforts 
were largely ignored.   
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recovered any of the money due from HANQI Group or its subsidiaries. Subsequently, 
FENG HUA stock was put into Special Treatment (ST) status as a result of reporting 
two consecutive annual losses.   
 
The money that large shareholders owe the listed company is included in a data item 
called “Other Receivables” (OREC), which in this instance also included several other 
large items not directly traceable to HANQI.  Unlike trade receivables, which are 
separately reported under the customary title of “Accounts Receivables”, these 
corporate borrowings are not part of ordinary business transactions, and are thus 
separately flagged in the report. 
 
III.2 Large Share Holders and OREC 
To better understand the extent to which “other receivables” is used as a vehicle for 
large shareholder tunneling, we secured hand collected data used by Ye (2006).  
From financial footnotes, Ye derived Other Receivables due from controlling 
shareholders and its affiliated companies for all manufacturing firms listed in the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange between 1999 and 2002 (a sample of 1134 firm-years, or 
approximately 30% of our full sample during these years).  For each year between 
1999 and 2002, we sort all listed Chinese firms annually into ten deciles based on 
ORECTA (full sample).  We then use the Ye (2006) data to examine the proportion 
of OREC in each decile directly traceable to the majority shareholder and its affiliates. 
 
Appendix 2 reports the number of firm-years in Ye (2006) captured by each ORECTA 
decile in our full sample.  Column 3 shows that the Ye sample is quite evenly spread 
out over our full sample.  Column 4 shows that the average ORECTA balance from 
the Ye sample also closely approximates the average for the full sample.  Columns 5 
and 6 report the total gross OREC and the large shareholder gross receivable (LSH 
Gross OREC) derived from the Ye (2006) data set, and Column 7 reports LSH 
receivable as a percentage of total gross OREC. 
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Overall, this evidence shows that a substantial portion of OREC is directly traceable 
to the largest shareholder and its affiliates, particularly for firms in the high ORECTA 
deciles.  For example, firms in the top 3 deciles by ORECTA (full sample) have 30 
to 40 percent of its OREC balance directly traceable to the majority shareholder or 
affiliates.  Moreover, the proportion owed by LSH decreases monotonically across 
the ORECTA deciles, further indicating that problem of large shareholder tunneling is 
also likely to decrease in severity in the lower ORECTA deciles.20   
 
As a final check, we compared our OREC measure to the amount of inter-corporate 
loans to controlling shareholders reported in an official list of 189 firms identified by 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges on June 1, 2006.  These 189 firms 
were flagged by the two exchanges as those in which the problem of controlling 
shareholder tunneling is most severe.  We collected the amount of OREC from the 
2005 annual reports of these 189 firms, and found the Pearson correlation between our 
OREC measure and the amount of LSH OREC reported on this official list to be 
73.7%.  Moreover, 43.75% of these firms were in the highest 2005 ORECTA decile, 
and nearly 90% were in our top four ORECTA deciles. 
 
The evidence thus far strongly suggests that by ranking firms using ORECTA, we 
have a good empirical proxy for the degree of inter-corporate lending to the 
controlling shareholder and its affiliates.  In the following analyses, we aim to better 
understand the nature and economic consequences of these loans. 
 
 
                                                        
20 To further ascertain the extent to which the Ye (2006) sample is representative of the full sample, we 
checked a number of other firm characteristics.  The details are not reported but are available on 
request.  In brief, the Ye firms are not significantly different from the rest of the firm-years in our 
sample in terms of Size, BM, and ROA.  However, the Ye sample shows slightly higher state 
ownership (34.95% versus 31.55%) and lower ORECTA (7.67% versus 8.88%).  In the current 
context, these differences are likely to understate the extent to which ORECTA is attributable to the 
majority shareholder and its affiliates in the Ye sample.  
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III.3 The Persistence of ORECTA 
To better understand the nature of these receivables, we sort firms into ten deciles 
based on ORECTA, and trace the evolution of this variable through time. Figure 1A 
reports the mean ORECTA for each decile in year t through t+3, and Figure 1B 
reports the average decile ranking for the same four-year horizon. 
 
The main result from these analyses is that cross-sectional rankings of firms by 
ORECTA tend to be quite persistent over time. In other words, firms with larger 
(smaller) "Other Receivable" balances tend to remain in the upper (lower) end of the 
ORECTA over the next three years. For firms in the highest ORECTA decile in year t, 
the average "Other Receivable" in year t+3 is still 20% of total assets.  This evidence 
is consistent with the long-term nature of the receivables.  Specifically, it suggests 
that the receivable is a more or less permanent part of the companies' portfolio of 
reported assets. Cast in a different light, this evidence shows that listed Chinese 
companies are routinely engaged in the practice of extending long-term credit in large 
quantities to their largest shareholder. 
 
III.4 Economic Consequences 
In this section, we explore the economic consequences of large OREC balances.  
Specifically, we examine the implications of large ORECTA balances for firms’ future 
operating performance and the likelihood of experiencing financial distress. 
 
Table II Panel A reports the results of a regression in which the dependent variable, 
FROA, is the year t+1 return on asset.  Independent variables include the current 
year return-on-asset (ROA), and a rank variable, R_ORECTA, the scaled decile rank 
of ORECTA (i.e., R_ORECTA=1 for firms in the highest ORECTA decile, and =0 for 
firms in the lowest decile).  In addition, we use a number of other control variables: 
LEV is the total liability divided by total assets, SIZE is log of total assets, NEG is a 
dummy variable, which takes 1 if current year net income is negative and 0 otherwise; 
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we also control for firm and year fixed effects.21  The results show that R_ORECTA 
has a strong negative relation to future ROA, after controlling for other variables 
(T-statistic = -8.5).  In other words, controlling for current ROA, higher ORECTA 
firms earn lower future ROA.  The difference between top and bottom decile 
ORECTA firms’ expected ROA is 4.9%. 
 
In Table II panel B, we use a LOGIT model to estimate the effect of ORECTA on the 
probability of firms becoming “Special Treated” (attaining ST status) in year t+3.  
For this analysis, the dependent variable is a dummy variable, which takes 1 if the 
firm was specially treated and 0 otherwise. Independent variables include 
R_ORECTA and other control variables for predicting financial distress. ROA is 
operating income divided by total assets, ATURN is asset turnover, SG is sales 
growths from the last year, OCF is operating cash flow divided by total assets, 
NONOPERAT is non-operating income deflated by total assets, and BLOCK is the 
percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder.  Because we use variables in 
year t to predict special treatment in t+3, our sample size in Panel B reduces to 5,668 
observations.22 
 
Panel B reports the results of two LOGIT models.  In the first regression, we use all 
the independent variables except R_ORECTA.  The results show that ROA, ATURN, 
LEV, OCF, SIZE, and BLOCK all have some incremental power to predict future ST 
status.  In the second regression, we add R_ORECTA to the model, and find that it 
has a strongly positive coefficient.  In fact, aside from current year ROA, 
R_ORECTA is the single most important predictor of subsequent ST status.   
                                                        
21 None of the main results are affected if we only control for annual fixed effects (i.e. exclude firm 
fixed effect indicator variables).  Also, we obtain very similar results if we use return-on-sales (ROS) 
rather than return-on-assets (ROA) as the performance metric in this analysis. 
22 We predict ST status for year t+3 because firms that attain this status will have reported two 
consecutive years of losses.  We skip two years to avoid a peek-ahead bias.  As a robustness check, 
we also used year t+2 and t+4 ST status as the dependent variable and found similar results. 
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Figure 2 provides a graphic illustration of this result.  To construct this figure, we 
sort firms annually into ten deciles based on the magnitude of their reported ORECTA.  
This figure depicts the proportion of firms in each decile that received ST status two 
years after the formation of the deciles.  The results show a high proportion (14%) of 
the firms in the top ORECTA decile in year t will receive ST status in year t+3.  This 
compares to an average of around 4% to 5% for the rest of the sample.  The next two 
ORECTA deciles also exhibit a higher than average tendency to receive ST status. 
 
Overall, these results show that firms with high ORECTA balances perform worse in 
terms of operating performance, and are much more likely to become a candidate for 
delisting in future years.  In the next section, we examine the extent to which market 
prices reflect these adverse consequences. 
 
III.5 Market Pricing and Returns Prediction 
Table III presents an analysis of the impact of tunneling on firm valuation.  The 
dependent variable for this analysis is MVTA, defined as the market value of the firm 
at the end of the fourth month after fiscal year end, deflated by total assets.  The 
independent variables are as defined in Table II, except for: BVTA, defined as book 
value deflated by total assets, and ROA_ORECTA, an interaction term.  To compute 
this last variable we multiply ROA by R_ORECTA.  To the extent that the market 
applies a greater discount to the earnings of high-ORECTA firms, we would expect 
the coefficient on ROA_ORECTA to be negative.  Once again we include dummy 
variables to control for firm and year fixed effects.   
 
The results show that this is indeed the case.  As expected the coefficients on both 
BVTA and ROA are positive.  The coefficient on R_ORECTA is, surprisingly, not 
significant in Model 1 and reliably positive in Model 3, suggesting that the market 
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does not generally value high ORECTA firms at a discount.  However, the 
coefficient on ROA_ORECTA is reliably negative in both Models 2 and 3.  The 
coefficient estimates from Model 2 indicate that for the highest ORECTA decile firms, 
the market assigns an average multiple of just 4 to reported earnings (13.8 – 9.8).  
Conversely, for low ORECTA firms, the multiple on earnings is 13.8.   
 
Table IV examines the usefulness of ORECTA in predicting future returns.  Panel A 
presents future monthly size-adjusted returns (in percentage) for deciles formed on 
ORECTA. In each year between 1996 and 2004, we sort firms into ten deciles based 
on ORECTA.  We then compute future returns begin from May 1 (year t+1) through 
April 30 (year t+2).  Table values in the first column (EW-ADJ) represent the 
average monthly equal-weighted size-adjusted returns for each portfolio.23 Table 
values in column 2 (FF-ADJ) are the intercept terms from time-series regression of 
each portfolio’s monthly returns on the returns from three factor-mimicking portfolios 
(MKT, HML, SMB), constructed in the same manner as Fama and French (1993), but 
using Chinese data. 
 
In panel B, we compute risk-adjusted returns using a Fama-McBeth procedure.  
Specifically, every month we regress monthly returns on R_ORECTA, R_MV (scaled 
decile rank of market value at the end of April (t+1)), R_BM (scaled decile rank of the 
Book-to-Market ratio), R_STDRET (standard deviation of daily returns during the 
month prior to portfolio formation), and R_LEV (scaled decile rank of leverage, 
defined as total liability divided by total assets).  Each of the control variables has 
been associated with future realized returns in Chinese markets (e.g., see Eun and 
Huang (2007)).  In total there are 108 months.  Panel B reports the mean of these 
monthly coefficients and the t-statistics associated with their time-series variation. 
 
The evidence in both panels supports the view that ORECTA is negatively correlated 
                                                        
23 To compute size-adjusted returns, we subtract the average return for the firms in the same size decile 
each month.  Size decile returns are as reported by the CCER database. 
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with future returns.  Panel A shows that low-ORECTA firms generally earn higher 
returns than high-ORECTA firms.  The pattern is not monotonic across the deciles, 
but the difference in monthly returns between the top and bottom ORECTA firms 
(from 0.810% to 1.014% per month) is statistically significant.  Panel B results show 
that this negative correlation with future returns is robust to the inclusion of market 
capitalization (MV), book-to-market (BM), idiosyncratic risk (STDRET) and leverage 
(LEV).  In fact, R_ORECTA is the single most reliable predictor (by T-statistic) 
among the known factors. 
 
Table V examines the consistency of this result year-by-year.  Table values represent 
returns to a hedge strategy that buys the low-ORECTA decile portfolio and sells short 
the high-ORECTA portfolio. In computing abnormal returns, we use four different 
benchmarks to adjust for alternative measures of risk.  ARET1 is the hedge return 
where each firm’s abnormal return is computed relative to a reference decile portfolio 
formed on the basis of its market value of tradable shares (size-adjusted); ARET2 is 
abnormal returns relative to portfolios formed on deciles of firm beta (beta-adjusted); 
ARET3 is relative to an equal-weighted market index (EW-index); ARET4 is relative 
to a value-weighted market index for tradable shares of both the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen markets (VW-index);  ARET5 is the annual average of the monthly 
coefficients on R_ORECTA derived from monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions with 
control variables as describe in Panel B of Table IV (FM-Adj).  Reported t-statistics 
are based on the time-series variation in annual abnormal returns.   
 
Table V shows that high-ORECTA firms consistently underperform low-ORECTA 
firms regardless of the benchmark.  The spread between the high and low ORECTA 
firms is most pronounced in the second half of the sample period (2000 to 2004).  
During this sub-period, high-ORECTA firms underperformed low-ORECTA firms by 
1.14% to 1.43% per month, depending on the benchmark.  It is perhaps not 
surprising that tunneling schemes tend to unravel in bear markets.  As firms undergo 
economic stress, the non-performing asset problems associated with tunneling become 
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more transparent.  For example, in Lemmon and Lins (2003) the effects of tunneling 
are only reflected in firms’ price declines during the Asian Financial Crisis.   
 
We find further support for this view when we examined the Allowance for Bad Debt 
balances for our sample firms.  The average Gross ORECTA balance for our firms 
did not decline over time, but the average Net ORECTA (our measure) did.  This is 
because Chinese firms, on average, increased their Allowance for Bad Debt every 
year in the post-2000 period.24  As this Allowance is increased, reported earnings are 
simultaneously decreased, thus making the valuation consequences more transparent.  
This finding helps to explain the greater hedge returns in the latter period, despite 
lower ORECTA balances. 
 
III.6 Ancillary Tests 
In this section, we examine cross-sectional factors that could affect the severity of the 
tunneling problem across firms.  Our first test is motivated by international evidence 
that tunneling is most problematic when the block holder’s controlling right (C) is 
much larger than her ownership right (O).25  The intuition is straightforward: as the 
C/O ratio increases, the controlling shareholder derives relatively greater benefit from 
tunneling activities.  In China, the largest block holder has effective control, even 
when holding a relatively low percentage of total shares.  Therefore, we would 
expect the tunneling problem to be most severe in low BLOCK firms (i.e. firms 
whose percentage held by the largest shareholder are lowest).  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between ORECTA and BLOCK (the percentage of 
                                                        
24 The WIND database separately reports Gross and Net Other Receivables after 2000.  The average 
Gross Other Receivables for our sample firms in 2001 was 12.5 million RMB.  This variable 
increased every year, to a balance of 13.9 million RMB in 2004.  However, this increase was more 
than offset by the increase in the average Bad Debt Allowance (11% of Gross Other Receivables in 
2001 and increasing to 16% of Gross Other Receivables in 2004).  As a result, Net ORECTA 
decreased each year throughout this period.   
25 See, for example, Lemmon and Lin (2003) and Claessens et al. (2002). 
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shares outstanding held by the largest shareholder).  To construct this graph, we sort 
firms each year into 10 deciles based on the percentage of common shares held by the 
biggest shareholder (BLOCK). We then calculate the median of ORECTA in each 
decile. The figure depicts the distribution of ORECTA in each BLOCK decile. The 
X-axis is decile rankings based on BLOCK.  BLOCK values are on the left Y-axis, 
ORECTA values are on the right Y-axis. 
 
Figure 3 shows that the use of ORECTA is most pervasive when the block holder’s 
controlling right (C) is much larger than her ownership right (O).  Specifically, 
ORECTA balances are highest when the controlling shareholder holds less than 30% 
of the shares.  In fact, in the top BLOCK decile (where the controlling shareholder 
owns over 70% of cash-flow rights), ORECTA balances are quite low (around 2%).   
 
Table VI provides a more comprehensive analysis of factors that could affect the 
severity of the tunneling problem across firms.  The dependent variable in this 
analysis is ORECTA.  The independent variables are: BLOCK; ROA 
(return-on-assets from the prior year); SIZE (log of total assets); STATE (a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the largest shareholder is any level of 
government or any government-owned institution); Central and Local (dummy 
variables indicating whether the largest shareholder is a central government or local 
government agency); MARKETIZATION (a comprehensive index measuring the 
development of the regional market in which the firm is registered (see Fan and Wang 
(2006)), where higher values indicate greater regional market development; and 
LAYER (the number of intermediate layers between the company and its controlling 
owner through the longest pyramidal chain (see Fan et al. (2007)).  We also include 
industry and year fixed effect dummies.   
 
Model 1 reports the result when only ROA, BLOCK, and SIZE are included as 
explanatory variables.  This model shows that ORECTA is higher for smaller firms 
and less profitable firms.  Consistent with the univariate analysis, BLOCK has a 
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strong negative relation with ORECTA after controlling for SIZE and ROA.  Model 
2 adds STATE and shows that this form of tunneling is worse when the controlling 
shareholder is not a state-owned enterprise.  Non-state entities that control listed 
firms include regional collectives and private entrepreneurs.  Our evidence suggests 
that, on average, companies controlled by these entities tend to have more severe 
tunneling problems.  Model 3 adds MARKETIZATION and shows that the tunneling 
problem is marginally attenuated if the firm is located in a more developed region of 
the country.  This is consistent with the notion that tunneling is a bigger problem in 
less developed areas of China, and is analogous to the cross-country findings in 
Nenova (2003).   
 
In Model 4, we separate state-owned enterprises (STATE) into Local and Central 
agencies, and find that tunneling problems appear to be relatively more severe in 
Local-government controlled enterprises.  The difference between Central and Local 
is statistically significant.  This finding is consistent with Cheung et al. (2008), who 
analyze a sample of related party transactions and find that local government 
controlled entities tend to have a greater problem with expropriations through transfer 
pricing.  They argue that is because local government bureaucrats are less likely to 
be prosecuted for misappropriation of state funds.  Finally, Model 5 shows that the 
number of layers of ownership in the pyramidal structure (LAYER) is not related to 
the level of ORECTA.   
 
Overall, the results of these regressions confirm that BLOCK is strongly negatively 
correlated with ORECTA.  At the same time, it shows that SIZE, ROA, STATE, and 
MARKETIZATION also contribute in explaining the degree of tunneling across firms.  
In particular, local government controlled firms have a more severe problem than 
central government controlled firms, and non-state controlled firms have a more 
severe problem than state controlled firms.  
 
Thus far we have seen that ORECTA is higher for low ROA firms.  At the same time, 
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ORECTA is incrementally useful in predicting future ROA (after controlling for 
current ROA).  An interesting question is whether tunneling is a consequence or a 
cause of poor performance.  While our data do not allow us to fully address this issue, 
we attempt to provide some evidence on it in Table VII.  This table presents annual 
industry-adjusted ROA in the years immediately adjacent to a large increase in 
ORECTA (defined either as an increase in decile ranking of 5 or more (Panel A), or as 
an increase in ORECTA of 0.15 or more, starting from a low base (Panel B)).  In 
effect, Panel A identifies firms in the lower five deciles in year t-1 that moved to the 
higher five decile in year t.  Similarly, Panel B identifies firms in one of the lowest 7 
deciles in year t-1 that moved to one of the three highest deciles in year t.26   
 
The results in Panel A of Table VII show that for the firms with a large increase in 
ORECTA ranking, industry adjusted ROA in years t-2 and t-1 are not significantly 
different from zero, but ROA in years t, t+1, and t+2 are significantly worse than 
industry average.  The results in Panel B provide some evidence that performance 
began to decay in year t-1 for firms with large ORECTA balance increases, but that 
the assumption of the loan is a strong predictor of worse future performance still holds.  
We find virtually identical results using other ROA cutoffs.  In general, the evidence 
suggests that while poor operating performance (weakly) increases the likelihood of a 
large increase in ORECTA, a large increase in ORECTA is a strong predictor of future 
deterioration in operating performance. 
 
The fact that a relatively transparent disclosure item is not fully priced seems curious.  
Investigating further, we find that institutional investors and mutual funds play a small 
role in Chinese markets.  Table VIII presents total shareholdings of Mutual Funds 
and all Institutional Investors (including mutual funds, Social Security Funds, Pension 
                                                        
26 For Panel A, we also tested firms whose ORECTA decile rank increased by at least 4 or 6 in year t.  
For Panel B, we also tested firms whose ORECTA are less than 0.10 in year t-1 and whose change in 
ORECTA is 0.12, 0.15, or 0.18 or greater in year t.  None of the key results are affected by these 
perturbations. 
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Funds) as a percentage of total shares outstanding or total tradable shares.  We 
obtained annual mutual fund ownership data from 1999 to 2004, and end-of-year 
institutional ownership data of 2004 from WIND Information Company.  This table 
shows that average ownership by mutual funds in is only 1.33% of total shares 
outstanding (2.8% of tradable shares).  As of the end of 2004, ownership by all 
institutional investors, including Mutual Funds, Social Security Funds, and Pension 
Funds, is only 3.75% (8.26% of tradable shares).  Interestingly, we find that 
institutional ownership is highest among low ORECTA firms, suggesting that the 
institutions tend to avoid high ORECTA firms.  Evidently these investors do take 
ORECTA balances into account, but their collective effect on pricing is limited.  
Collectively, our findings suggest that the private rents to controlling shareholders 
might not be fully incorporated in normal expected returns. 
 
Some prior studies (e.g., Allen et al. (2005)) allege that weakness in the audit 
profession is at least partially to blame for China’s corporate governance woes.  We 
attempt to shed some light on this issue by assessing the large sample relation 
between audit qualifications and ORECTA balances.  In Panel A of Table IX, we 
examine the extent to which ORECTA balances are related to the likelihood of 
receiving an audit qualification.  In this test, we use a LOGIT model where the 
dependent variable, Q, equals 1 if the firm receives a qualified audit opinion and 0 
otherwise.  LQ (lagged Q) is the corresponding auditor opinion variable in the 
previous year.  AR is accounts receivable deflated by total assets.  ORECTA is as 
defined earlier. 
 
The Model 1 results in Panel A show that ORECTA is highly significant, and 
positively correlated with the probability of receiving a qualified opinion.  In terms 
of its ability to predict the likelihood of a qualified opinion, it is more important than 
any other variable, including ROA and LEV.  Model 2 shows that, even after 
including LQ (lagged Q), ORECTA is still highly significant.  Evidently auditors are 
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well aware ORECTA balances, and are willing to issue unclean opinions for high 
ORECTA firms.27 
 
Figure 4 offers a graphical depiction of this result.  This graph shows that 45% of all 
firms in the top ORECTA decile receive unclean opinions.  The probability of an 
unclean opinion declines almost monotonically across ORECTA deciles, such that 
only around 5% of the firms in the lower deciles receive unclean opinions.  Once 
again, the evidence is consistent with auditors playing a monitoring role with respect 
to tunneling activities using corporate loans. 
 
As a final test, we examine the effect of a qualified opinion on subsequent tunneling 
behavior.  Panel B of Table IX reports a regression of ORECTA in year t+1 on 
current year ORECTA, and dummy variable Q, as well as other control variables.  If 
firms curtail their tunneling activities after receiving a qualified opinion, we would 
expect the coefficient on Q to be negative.  Instead, we find that the Q coefficient is 
positive and significant, indicating that firms are more likely to increase their 
ORECTA balance after a qualified opinion.  This counter-intuitive result could be 
due, in part, to the fact that some firms charge an interest balance on the loans.  The 
interest, which is also typically not repaid, simply increases the outstanding loan 
balance.28  In any event, we find no evidence that firms receiving a qualified opinion 
in year t will reduce their use of OREC as a vehicle for tunneling in the next period. 
 
III.7 The Long Road to Regulatory Reform 
                                                        
27 To confirm these results, we read a large number of audit reports for top ORECTA decile firms.  In 
many cases, we found the report explicitly citing the Other Receivable balance as a reason for the audit 
qualification. 
28 Jian and Wong (2006) report that among their sample of Chinese firms with related party loans, 84% 
did not charge any significant interest. For the remaining firms, interest was generally accrued rather 
than paid in cash. 
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Thus far our analysis highlights a chronic problem that affected many listed firms in 
the Chinese market during the 1996 to 2006 time period.  In Appendix 3, we 
document the regulatory efforts to curb this abuse.   We provide a brief annotated 
discussion of these rules and regulations here.   
 
Opening Rounds (Pre-2004) 
Efforts to reduce OREC balances began as early as 2001, when the CSRC issued a 
(largely ignored) request to listed companies to stop the practice of lending to 
controlling shareholders.  Coincidentally, 2001 was the first year that the Chinese 
stock market showed clear signs of being in a serious decline (a bear market that 
would last until 2006).  By August 2003, the CSRC had issued explicit instructions 
calling for an end to loans by listed companies to controlling shareholders (CSRC 
Rule 2003-56).  In fact, the same ruling required listed companies to reduce their 
OREC balances to their controlling shareholder by 30% per year.  This ruling was 
also largely ignored, perhaps because the CSRC had no means of enforcing punitive 
action against the controlling shareholders, most of whom were not publicly listed. 
 
The Middle Game (2004-2005) 
In January 2004, against the backdrop of a bleak 3-year-old bear market, the State 
Council issued Directive 2004-3, titled “On the reform and development of capital 
markets.”  A section of this directive specifically addresses the problem of tunneling, 
and states “we must prevent controlling shareholders from embezzling listed company 
assets, and punish those who did.”  This directive provided the CSRC a much needed 
mandate to take action against controlling shareholders. 
 
In July 27, 2004, recognizing the difficulties most controlling shareholders will have 
in making repayments, CSRC proposes “Debt for Equity Swaps”, whereby the 
controlling shareholder may (subject to approval) repay the amount owed by 
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exchanging the loan for their equity position in the listed company.  In June 6, 2005, 
CSRC Rule 2005-37 spelled out explicit non-compliance penalties.  Perhaps most 
importantly, the rule states that in 2006, CSRC will disclose the names of all 
controlling shareholders who still owe balances of 100 million or more RMB as of 
December 31, 2005, as well as names of the chairperson of the controlling entity.   
 
In November 1, 2005, the State Council issued a Directive on Behalf of CSRC.  
Broadly titled “On Improving the Quality of Listed Companies”, this directive 
acknowledged that the listed companies are in bad shape, and prescribed a sweeping 
list of changes (targeting controlling shareholders).  In particular, this directive stated 
that the top management of controlling shareholders or colluding firms will be 
personally punished, if such payments remain outstanding by the end of 2006. 
 
The End Game (2006) 
November 7, 2006, in an unprecedented move, eight government ministries issued a 
joint announcement, making it clear that the top management of controlling entities 
will be fired from their post and face disciplinary punishment if the December 31, 
2006 deadline is not met.29  By December 31, 2006, 399 listed companies managed 
to resolve OREC balances totaling 39 billion RMB.  Another 17 listed companies, 
with OREC balances totally 9.2 billion RMB, failed to resolve their loans.  In 10 out 
of these 17 companies, top management of the controlling entity or colluding entities, 
were arrested – thus bringing to a close an extraordinary chapter in securities market 
regulation history. 
 
IV. Summary 
This study documents the widespread use of corporate loans by controlling 
shareholders to extract funds from Chinese listed companies.  Typically reported as 
                                                        
29  These ministries represent a broad spectrum of governmental agencies that, 
collectively, had the power to ensure the top management of controlling shareholders 
will be arrested if necessary. 
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"Other Receivables" (OREC), these loans represent a substantial portion of the 
reported assets and market capitalization of Chinese firms.  We show that these loans 
are of a long-term nature, that they are typically made to parties related to the 
controlling shareholder, and that they were used extensively to transfer funds out of 
hundreds of Chinese firms in the 1996 to 2006 time period.  We also find that firms 
with large OREC-to-total-asset (ORECTA) balances experience worse future 
operating performance and are much more likely to become candidates for delisting.   
 
Market participants seem to only partially anticipate these negative outcomes.  While 
the market applies a higher discount rate to the earnings of high-ORECTA firms, 
high-ORECTA firms still earn negative risk-adjusted returns over the next 12-months.  
Institutional investors and mutual funds tend to avoid high ORECTA firms and hold a 
disproportionally large percentage of low ORECTA firms.  However, institutional 
ownership is a relatively small part of the Chinese market landscape, a fact that likely 
contributes to the persistence of the mispricing.  Collectively, our evidence suggests 
that the private rents extracted by controlling shareholders might not be fully 
incorporated in normal expected returns. 
 
We show this form of tunneling is most severe when the block shareholder’s 
controlling right (C) is significantly larger than her ownership right (O).  Specifically, 
we find that ORECTA balances are highest in firms where the controlling 
shareholder’s cash-flow ownership right (O) is less than 40%.  As the controlling 
shareholder’s ownership right increases, the incentive to tunnel diminishes and so 
does ORECTA.  We also find that the severity of the tunneling problem is greater for 
smaller, worse performing, non-state-owned firms, particularly if they are located in 
regions of the country that are less economically developed. 
 
We also provide some evidence on why various legal and extra-legal governance 
mechanisms were inadequate in containing this practice.  We show that 
high-ORECTA firms are much more likely to receive a qualified audit opinion.  In 
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fact, 45% of the firms in the highest ORECTA decile receive a qualified opinion 
(compared to less than 5% among low ORECTA firms).  However, firms that receive 
a qualified opinion in year t show no inclination to reduce their ORECTA balance in 
year t+1.  These findings show that auditors do play a monitoring role, but absent 
effective enforcement (either by regulators or informed investors), unclean audit 
opinions alone are insufficient to deter tunneling behavior. 
 
Finally, we document the long and arduous efforts by the CSRC and other regulators 
to put an end to this particular form of tunneling.  We show that between 2001 and 
the end of 2006, numerous rulings, directives and other edicts were issued.  These 
efforts culminated in an eight ministry joint statement in November 2006 which 
threatened personal action against the top management of controlling shareholders 
unless all inter-corporate loans from listed companies are repatriated by December 31, 
2006.  This unprecedented show of political resolve finally forced the repatriation of 
most of the remaining OREC balances – which, even as late as 2006, amounted to 
close to 50 billion RMB, involving over 400 firms.   
 
Overall, our findings provide a portrait of the nature and severity of the tunneling 
problem in China, and the on-going challenges associated with regulatory reform in 
this major emerging economy.  Our evidence shows that, in certain settings, 
disclosure alone is not enough.  Specifically, when minority shareholders have no 
private litigation channels, and when market regulators have limited jurisdiction over 
the controlling entities, even an extremely transparent form of tunneling can persist 
for many years.  These findings argue for increased legal, rather than extra-legal, 
regulatory measures in curbing Chinese insider abuse. 
 
Although the specific form of abuse associated with inter-corporate loan has largely 
ceased, the economic incentives that gave rise to this behavior are still intact.  Under 
China’s recent regulatory reform, controlling shareholders’ holdings have now largely 
been converted into tradable status.  However, the Chinese government has signaled 
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its intent to retain control of all state-owned listed companies.  At the time of this 
writing, Chinese laws restrict both the timing and amount of the sale of controlling 
blocks, and analysts project the lower bound on the government’s intended 
shareholdings to be between 25% and 60% for Chinese firms in most industries.30   
 
Given these developments, in spite of the considerable progress made to date, we 
remain cautious about the resolution of the tunneling problem in China.  At least in 
the foreseeable future, China’s Listed Sector will continue to be dominated by 
controlling shareholders whose benefit from firm price appreciation will be limited.  
In fact, most controlling shareholders will face an even wider gap between their 
controlling rights (C) and cash ownership rights (O) – thus potentially increasing 
tunneling incentives.   
 
Until these fundamental agency issues are resolved, we believe the threat of tunneling 
will remain a concern for Chinese investors and regulators.  At the same time, 
academics interesting in understanding managerial and investor behavior in China 
would do well to keep the tunneling perspective in mind.
                                                        
30 In a May 2006 report, Hualin Securities analyst Fupeng Qi, after analyzing a vast number of 
regulations, rulings, policy announcements and speeches by government officials, classified listed 
companies into five groups, and estimated lower bounds on the government’s intended shareholding in 
listed companies for each:  
Group 1: Listed companies in industries that are critical to national or economic security, or provide 
important public goods or services. For this group, the government minimum holding is 60%. 
Group 2: Listed companies in important energy or natural resources industries, or major high-tech 
industries. For this group, the minimum government shareholding is 51%.  
Group 3: Listed firms in agriculture, and manufacturing, no less than 35%. 
Group 4: Listed firms in highly competitive industries, no less than 25% 
Group 5: listed firms in retailing and other service industries, no less than 10%. 
Of course, these estimates only apply to controlling shareholders that are state-owned. However, we 
have no reason to believe non-state-owned block holders will be any more eager to relinquish their 
controlling positions. 
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Appendix 1: FENG HUA: A Case Study in Large Shareholder Tunneling 
 
The HANQI Group is the largest shareholder of FENG HUA (stock code: 600615), holding a bit less than 30% of its shares.  From 
early 2002, the HANQI Group (including its subsidiaries HANQI Real Estate, and Beijing HANQI) “borrowed” large amounts of 
money from FENG HUA. The following table contains excerpts from FENG HUA's financial statements.  To gain a sense for the 
magnitude of these borrowing, on December 31, 2002, HANQI’s share of equity in FENG HUA is RMB 116.21 millions.  On that 
date, it and its subsidiaries borrowed from FENG HUA a total of 198.6 millions.  In terms of financial reporting, the money that large 
shareholders owe the listed company is included in a data item called “Other Receivables” (OREC), which in this instance also 
included several other large items not directly traceable to HANQI. 52.2 millions RMB were written off on December 31, 2004 
because Beijing HANQI no longer existed (bankrupt). FENG HUA was subsequently “specially treated (ST)”. All table values are in 
millions RMB, except percentages. All data is available on SINA finance website. 
 
Reporting 
Date 
Gross 
OREC Total Assets
Gross 
OREC/ 
Total Assets 
 
Gross 
OREC from 
HANQI 
Group 
Gross 
OREC from 
Beijing 
HANQI 
Gross 
OREC from 
HANQI 
Real Estate
Total Gross 
OREC from 
HANQI 
HANQI’s 
% in Gross 
OREC 
Item (1) (2) (1)/(2) (4) (5) (6) 
(7)=(4)+(5)+
(6) (7)/(3) 
2004-12-31 304.4 693.2 44% 122.2 0 31.7 153.9 51% 
2004-06-30 308.0 781.2 39% 122.2 52.2 30.0 204.4 66% 
2003-12-31 328.4 804.5 41% 122.2 52.2 30.0 204.4 62% 
2003-06-30 362.8 940.4 39% 116.5 52.2 30.0 198.6 55% 
2002-12-31 342.9 947.6 36% 116.4 52.2 30.0 198.6 58% 
2002-06-30 306.2 1078.5 28% 122.0 52.2 30.0 204.2 67% 
2001-12-31 189.6 1084.2 17%   52.2 30.0 82.2 43% 
2001-06-30 66.0 1193.9 6%           
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Appendix 2: The Proportion of Large Shareholder Receivables (LSH Gross OREC) 
within each ORECTA Decile 
 
This table reports the gross amount of large shareholder receivable as a proportion of 
total other receivables (OREC) for firms sorted by ORECTA decile.  To construct this 
table, we first sort our full sample of firm-years annually into deciles by ORECTA.  We 
then report aggregate statistics for the Ye (2006) firm-year observations within each 
ORECTA decile.  Ye (2006) hand collected the amount of other receivables due from the 
controlling shareholder and its affiliates (LSH Gross OREC) for all manufacturing firms 
listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange between 1999 and 2002.  This table reports the 
number of Ye observations in each decile, the average ORECTA value, the average LSH 
Gross OREC value, and LSH Gross OREC expressed as a percentage of total gross 
OREC. 
 
 
 Full Sample Ye (2006) Sample 
 ORECTA 
 
Number of Ye 
(2006) 
firm-years in 
full sample 
deciles ORECTA
Total Gross 
OREC 
LSH 
Gross 
OREC 
 (LSH 
gross /Total 
gross) 
Low 0.56% 139 0.40% 8.38  1.04  6.60% 
2 1.62% 156 1.20% 24.40  6.05  14.30% 
3 2.74% 115 2.10% 47.15  13.63  16.70% 
4 4.01% 112 3.10% 74.66  11.78  15.10% 
5 5.37% 103 4.20% 111.16  27.44  19.00% 
6 6.99% 95 5.90% 107.58  21.45  22.00% 
7 9.13% 104 7.80% 138.67  43.26  24.30% 
8 12.10% 105 10.90% 186.06  50.54  30.70% 
9 17.22% 109 16.40% 263.91  90.54  30.90% 
High 31.97% 96 32.50% 481.44  252.12  42.20% 
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Appendix 3: The Long Road to Regulatory Reform 
Rules and regulations specifically related to tunneling through inter-corporate loans 
 
Early 2001 – CSRC Requirement 
In early 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued a general 
requirement that all listed companies collect their “loans” (OREC) to controlling 
shareholders, but this requirement was widely ignored.   
 
August 28, 2003 – CSRC Rule 2003-56 
This rule prohibits listed firms from issuing new loans to (and loan guarantees on behalf 
of) the controlling shareholder and sets out specific targets and guidelines for reducing 
existing OREC balances.  Specifically, it requires listed companies to reduce the money 
controlling shareholders obtained from them, by 30% every year (starting 2003).   
 
January 2004 – State Council Directive 2004-3 
The State Council issued a board directive, a section of which specifically addresses the 
problem of tunneling, and states “we must prevent controlling shareholders from 
embezzling listed company assets, and punish those who did.”   
 
July 27, 2004 – CSRC Proposes “Debt for Equity Swaps” 
Recognizing that many controlling shareholders simply did not have enough cash to 
repay the OREC they owed, the CSRC proposed repayments by a debt for equity swap.   
 
June 6, 2005 – CSRC Rule 2005-37  
This rule outlines specific steps for regulators to follow in the case of non-compliance.  
Importantly, the rule states that in 2006, CSRC will disclose the names of all controlling 
shareholders still owing 100 million or more RMB as of December 31, 2005.   
 
November 1, 2005 – State Council Directive on Behalf of CSRC 
Written by the CSRC, but issued by the State Council, this rule prescribed sweeping 
changes to corporate governance and disclosure rules (targeting controlling shareholders).  
In particular, it set December 31, 2006 as a date by which all OREC from controlling 
entities and affiliates must be repaid.   
 
November 7, 2006 – Eight Ministry Joint Announcement 
Eight government ministries issued a joint announcement, making it clear that the top 
management of controlling entities will face disciplinary punishment if the deadline for 
repayment is not met.  Collectively, these agencies had the power to ensure top 
management of controlling shareholders will be arrested if necessary. 
 
By the December 31, 2006 deadline, 399 listed companies managed to resolve OREC 
balances totaling 39 billion RMB.  Another 17 companies, with OREC balances totally 
9.2 billion RMB, failed to resolve their loans.  In 10 out of these 17 companies, top 
management of the controlling/colluding entities, were arrested. 
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Table I 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents firm characteristics for our sample of 7,557 firm-year observations 
from 1996 to 2004.  Our sample includes firms that are listed in China’s stock market 
for at least one year and have necessary financial information.  Chinese firms all have 
December year-ends and financial information for year t is based on fiscal year-end t-1 
financial reports.  SIZE is the log of total assets; MV is market capitalization of the 
stock at the end of the fourth month after the fiscal year end (in million RENMINBI); 
TMV is market value of tradable market shares; BM is book-to-market ratio; LEV is 
leverage, defined as total liabilities divided by total assets; ROA is return on assets; 
BLOCK is the percentage of shares controlled by the largest shareholder; OREC is other 
receivables (in million RENMINBI); ORECMV is other receivables deflated by market 
value of equity; ORECTMV is other receivables deflated by market value of tradable 
shares; ORECTA is other receivable deflated by total assets;  We have winsorized all 
variables at 1% and 99%. 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Q1 Q3 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
SIZE 7557 20.966  20.901  0.883  20.363  21.528  
MV 7557 3150  2191  3324  1352  3589  
TMV 7557 1091  765  1227  465  1302  
BM 7557 0.331  0.276  0.223  0.180  0.421  
LEV 7557 0.455  0.455  0.177  0.329  0.581  
ROA 7557 0.028  0.034  0.063  0.010  0.058  
BLOCK 7538 0.437  0.426  0.173  0.292  0.582  
OREC 7557 123  56  362  21  131  
ORECMV 7557 0.054  0.026  0.087  0.009  0.061  
ORECTMV 7557 0.159  0.072  0.268  0.026  0.175  
ORECTA 7557 0.081  0.048  0.093  0.017  0.108  
Panel B: ORECTA by year 
1996 287 0.102  0.086  0.079  0.131  0.045  
1997 502 0.117  0.093  0.097  0.160  0.046  
1998 702 0.111  0.085  0.093  0.157  0.040  
1999 804 0.109  0.075  0.108  0.139  0.035  
2000 894 0.098  0.059  0.109  0.125  0.025  
2001 1007 0.071  0.039  0.087  0.091  0.016  
2002 1055 0.065  0.035  0.082  0.081  0.012  
2003 1127 0.056  0.029  0.074  0.069  0.010  
2004 1179 0.057  0.024  0.082  0.067  0.008  
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Table II 
Other Receivables as a Predictor of Future Operating Performance and the 
Probability of Becoming "Special Treated" 
 
This table examines the economic consequences of large shareholder tunneling. In panel 
A, we regress FROA, defined as return of assets in year t+1, on ROA of year t, 
R_ORECTA in year t and other control variables. LEV is total liability divided by total 
assets, SIZE is log of total assets, NEG is a dummy variable, which takes 1 if current year 
net income is negative and 0 otherwise.  R_ORECTA is a rank variable based on annual 
ranking of ORECTA into 10 deciles, and is scaled to be between 0 and 1.  In panel B, 
we use a LOGIT model to estimate the effects of ORECTA on the probability of firms 
becoming “Special Treated” two years later. The dependent variable is a dummy variable, 
which takes 1 if the firm was specially treated and 0 otherwise. Independent variables 
include R_ORECTA and other controlling variables for predicting financial distress. 
ATURN is asset turnover, SG is percentage sales growths from the previous year, OCF is 
operating cash flow divided by total assets, NONOPERAT is non-operating income 
deflated by total assets, and BLOCK is the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholder. Because we use variables in year T to predict special treatment status in t+3, 
our sample size in Panel B reduces to 5,668 observations.  
 
 
Panel A. The Usefulness of ORECTA in Predicting Future ROA 
 
 Coefficients T-statistics P-value 
INTERCEPT 0.772  6.740  <.0001 
ROA 0.301  9.930  <.0001 
R_ORECTA -0.049  -8.510  <.0001 
LEV 0.020  1.660  0.096  
SIZE -0.029  -8.390  <.0001 
NEG -0.022  -4.100  <.0001 
Fixed Effect Firm and Year   
Obs: 7,557    
ADJ-R2: 41.41%    
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(Table II Continued) 
 
Panel B: LOGIT model, where the dependent variable is the probability of a firm being 
in Special Treatment status in Year T+3 
 
 Coefficient Chi-Sq P-value Coefficient Chi-Sq P-value 
INTERCEPT 2.403  0.004  0.948  0.132  0.000  0.997  
R_ORECTA    1.428  26.705  <.0001 
ROA -28.787  72.547 <.0001 -26.101  58.431  <.0001 
ATURN -1.120  17.798 <.0001 -0.981  13.795  0.000  
LEV 1.425  10.337 0.001  1.121  6.173  0.013  
SG -0.227  2.712  0.100  -0.213  2.475  0.116  
OCF -2.582  7.778  0.005  -1.988  4.500  0.034  
NONOPERAT -2.560  0.161  0.688  -3.398  0.292  0.589  
SIZE -0.234  7.156  0.008  -0.167  3.520  0.061  
BLOCK -1.146  7.769  0.005  -0.838  4.006  0.045  
Fixed Effects Industry and 
Year   
Industry and 
Year   
Observations: 5,668       
PSEUDO-R2:  4.88%   5.36%   
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Table III 
The Relation between Other Receivables and Firm Valuation 
 
This table examines whether market prices take into consideration the negative impact of 
a large ORECTA balance on future operating performance.  The dependent variable is 
MVTA, defined as market value of the firm at the end of fourth month after fiscal year 
end, deflated by total assets.  The independent variables are: BVTA, defined as book 
value deflated by total assets; ROA, defined as the return on total assets; NEG, a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if current year net income is negative and 0 otherwise;  LEV, total 
liability divided by total assets;  SG, percentage sales growth from the previous year;  
SIZE, log of total assets; BLOCK, the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholder; R_ORECTA, the scaled decile rank of ORECTA (i.e., R_ORECTA=1 for 
firms in the highest ORECTA decile, and =0 for firms in the lowest decile); and 
ROA_ORECTA, an interaction term computed by multiplying ROA by R_ORECTA. ***, 
**, and * signify statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.  All 
regressions include firm and year fixed effects. 
 
Dependent Variable: MVTA 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
INTERCEPT 19.924*** 20.470*** 19.808*** 
R_ORECTA -0.010  0.357*** 
ROA_ORECTA  -9.835*** -11.865*** 
BVTA 0.728* 0.567 0.659* 
ROA 9.301*** 13.804*** 15.155*** 
NEG 1.060*** 0.843*** 0.810*** 
LEV -0.541 -0.569 -0.545 
SG 0.002 0.002 0.002 
SIZE -0.886*** -0.905*** -0.885*** 
BLOCK 0.201* 0.092 0.159* 
Fixed Effects 
Firm and 
Year 
Firm and 
Year 
Firm and 
Year 
No. of Observations 7,557 7,557 7,557 
Adjusted R2 50.51% 51.56% 51.77% 
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Table IV  
The Usefulness of Other Receivables in Returns Prediction 
 
This table examines the usefulness of ORECTA in predicting future returns. Panel A presents 
future monthly returns (in percentage) for deciles formed on ORECTA. In each year between 
1996 and 2004, we sort firms into ten deciles based on ORECTA for year t. EW-ADJ represents 
the average monthly equal-weighted returns for each portfolio, computed from May 1 (year t+1) 
through April 30 (year t+2), FF-ADJ represents the intercept term from regressing the monthly 
returns of each portfolio on three factor-mimicking portfolios (MKT, SMB, HML) constructed 
from all Chinese stocks using the Fama-French (1993) methodology.  Panel B presents 
Fama-McBeth cross-sectional regressions of monthly returns on R_ORECTA, R_MV (Market 
Value), R_BM (Book-to-Market), R_STDRET (standard deviation of daily returns during the 
month prior to portfolio formation) and R_LEV (total liability divided by total assets). The four 
independent variables are decile ranks based on annual ranking of ORECTA, MV, BM and LEV, 
and monthly ranking of STDRET respectively, scaled to be between 0 (lowest decile) and 1 
(highest decile).  In total there are 108 months. Panel B reports the mean of these monthly 
coefficients and the t-statistics associated with their time-series variation. 
 
Panel A. Returns of Portfolios Based on ORECTA 
Group Observations EW-ADJ FF-ADJ 
1 8978 0.395 0.177 
2 9039 0.343 0.206 
3 9065 0.146 0.037 
4 9051 0.170 0.124 
5 9016 -0.074 -0.152 
6 9042 0.189 0.184 
7 9061 -0.096 -0.189 
8 9001 0.008 0.004 
9 9023 -0.321 -0.370 
10 8825 -0.619 -0.633 
Hedge (1-10)  1.014 0.810 
  T =7.36 T=5.75 
 
Panel B. Cross-sectional Regression of Monthly Returns on R_ORECTA and Other 
Control Variables 
 Coefficient T-statistics P-value 
INTERCEPT 1.660 2.233 0.028 
R_ORECTA -0.722 -3.314 -0.001 
R_MV -1.621 -2.957 -0.004 
R_BM 0.444 1.066 0.289 
R_STDRET -1.407 -3.129 -0.002 
R_LEV 0.315 1.800 0.075 
 43
Table V 
Year-by-year Hedge Returns Adjusted for Different Measures of Risk 
 
This table presents average monthly abnormal returns for a trading strategy that buys an 
equal-weighted portfolio of firms in the lowest decile of ORECTA and sells an 
equal-weighted portfolio of firms in the highest decile of ORECTA.  Portfolio holdings 
are rebalanced annually and returns are computed from May 1 (year T+1) through April 
30 (year T+2).  We present year-by-year results as well as aggregated results for two 
sub-periods (the bull market of 1996-99, and the bear market of 2000-04).  In computing 
abnormal returns, we use four different characteristic-based matching samples to adjust 
for alternative measures of risk.  ARET1 is the hedge return where each firm’s abnormal 
return is computed relative to a reference decile portfolio matched on the basis of its 
market value of tradable shares (MktCap); ARET2 is abnormal returns relative to 
portfolios formed on deciles of firm beta (Beta-Match); ARET3 is relative to an 
equal-weighted market index (EW-index); ARET4 is relative to a value-weighted market 
index for tradable shares of both the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets (VW-index). 
ARET5 is the annual average of the monthly coefficients on R_ORECTA derived from 
monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions with control variables as describe in Table IV Panel 
B (FM-Adj).  Reported t-statistics are based on the time-series variation in annual 
abnormal returns. 
 
 
ARET1 
(MktCap)
ARET2 
(Beta) 
ARET3 
(EW) 
ARET4
(VW) 
ARET5 
(FM) 
1996 0.406  -0.171  -0.049  -0.049 0.271  
1997 0.011  -0.271  -0.237  -0.237 0.406  
1998 0.633  0.444  0.546  0.546 0.004  
1999 0.091  -0.206  -0.234  -0.236 0.085  
2000 0.873  0.615  0.624  0.629 0.535  
2001 1.044  1.341  1.516  1.505 0.829  
2002 1.226  1.419  1.833  1.924 1.217  
2003 2.505  2.444  2.528  2.520 1.886  
2004 0.065  0.514  0.654  0.608 1.263  
Average 0.685  0.613  0.718  0.721 0.722  
T-test 2.454  1.909  2.091  2.076 3.246  
      
96-99 
Bull Market 0.285  -0.051  0.006  0.006 0.191 
00-04 
Bear Market 1.143  1.267  1.431  1.437 1.146 
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Table VI 
The Determinants of ORECTA 
 
In this table we examine the determinants of ORECTA. The dependent variable is ORECTA. 
The independent variables are: ROA, the return on total assets in the previous fiscal year; 
BLOCK, the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder; SIZE, the log of total 
assets; STATE, a dummy variable which takes value one if the largest shareholder is any 
government-owned institution; Central and Local are dummy variables indicating whether 
the largest shareholder is a Central government or local government agency; 
MARKETIZATION, a comprehensive index measuring the development of the regional 
market in which the firm is registered (see Fan and Wang (2006)), where higher values 
indicate greater regional market development; LAYER, the number of intermediate layers 
between the company and its controlling owner through the longest pyramidal chain, defined 
following Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007). ***, **, and * signify statistical significance at the 1, 
5, and 10% levels, respectively.  All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
INTERCEPT 0.402***  0.386***  0.393***  0.392***  0.389*** 
ROA -0.340*** -0.380*** -0.383*** -0.382***  -0.381*** 
BLOCK -0.062*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.054***  -0.055*** 
SIZE -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014***  -0.014*** 
STATE  -0.015*** -0.016***   
    -Central    -0.020*** -0.018*** 
-Local    -0.015*** -0.013*** 
MARKETIZATION   -0.001** -0.001** -0.002*** 
LAYER     0.001 
No. of Observations 7,479 6,094 5,960 5,960 5,874 
Adjusted R2 17.66% 19.44% 19.73% 19.77%  19.99% 
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Table VII 
Annual Industry-adjusted ROA Surrounding Large Increases in ORECTA 
 
This table presents annual industry-adjusted ROA in the years immediately adjacent to a 
large increase in ORECTA. We define a large ORECTA increase in two ways.  For panel 
A, we sort firms each year into ten deciles based on ORECTA (Decile 1 are low 
ORECTA firms and Decile 10 are high ORECTA firms). We then focus on the subset of 
companies whose ORECTA decile rank increases by 5 or more in year t.  For panel B, 
we examine firms that had ORECTA less than 0.15 in year t-1, but reported an increase of 
at least 0.15 in year t. Table values represent the annual industry adjusted ROA for these 
large ORECTA increase firms in year t-2 to t+2. Industries are defined according to the 
2-digit code assigned by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).  For each 
year, we test the statistical significance of the deviation from industry mean ROA, and the 
statistical significance of the change from the previous year. ***, **, and * signify 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Firms whose ORECTA decile rank increased by 5 or more in year t  
Year Obs Mean T-stat on deviation from industry mean 
T-stat on change 
from previous year 
-2 91 -0.001 0.12     
-1 121 -0.001 0.23    0.02 
0 123 -0.018 2.89*** 2.19** 
1 101 -0.013 2.30** 0.52 
2 83 -0.023 3.01*** 1.03 
     
Panel B: Firms whose ORECTA are less 0.15 in year t-1 and whose change in 
ORECTA is 0.15 or greater in year t 
Year Obs Mean T-stat on deviation from industry mean 
T-stat on change 
from previous year 
-2 70 -0.012 1.38  
-1 87 -0.014 2.25** 0.15 
0 88 -0.066 5.70*** 3.98*** 
1 69 -0.039 4.58*** 1.90* 
2 53 -0.047 3.92*** 0.57 
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Table VIII 
Institutional Ownership by ORECTA Deciles 
 
This table presents total shareholdings of Mutual Funds and all Institutional Investors 
(including mutual funds, Social Security Funds, Pension Funds) as a percentage of total 
shares outstanding or total tradable shares.  We report these values separately for each 
ORECTA deciles and in aggregate. Data for mutual fund holdings are available annually 
from 1999 to 2004, and data for all institutional investors are available only for year 
ending 2004. 
 
Panel A. Average Mutual Fund Holdings, 1999-2004 
  As percentage of total shares outstanding 
As percentage of 
tradable shares 
Group by 
ORECTA Obs Mean Median Mean Median 
1 603 3.368 0.307 6.008 0.546 
2 607 2.523 0.243 5.009 0.544 
3 608 1.639 0.085 3.364 0.160 
4 607 1.813 0.059 3.839 0.130 
5 606 1.120 0.021 2.799 0.071 
6 607 1.109 0.019 2.650 0.068 
7 609 0.693 0.000 1.665 0.000 
8 606 0.477 0.000 1.140 0.000 
9 609 0.400 0.000 0.993 0.000 
10 604 0.207 0.000 0.504 0.000 
All 6,066 1.334 0.005 2.796 0.015 
Panel B. Ownership by all Institutional Investors, 2004 
  As percentage of total shares outstanding 
As percentage of 
tradable shares 
Group by 
ORECTA Obs Mean Median Mean Median 
1 117 8.506  2.855  16.190  5.081  
2 118 6.896  2.690  14.566  6.383  
3 118 5.178  1.509  11.241  3.758  
4 118 5.018  1.315  10.624  3.311  
5 118 3.607  0.570  9.285  1.477  
6 118 3.233  0.465  8.005  1.069  
7 118 2.390  0.233  5.709  0.619  
8 118 0.967  0.271  2.473  0.766  
9 118 1.020  0.140  2.907  0.437  
10 118 0.638  0.085  1.662  0.232  
All 1,179 3.745 0.499 8.259  1.257  
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Table IX 
The Monitoring Role of Auditors 
 
This table examines the monitoring role of auditors. Panel A tests whether firms with 
more ORECTA are more likely to receive unclean auditor opinions. We use a LOGIT 
model where the dependent variable is Q, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm 
receives a qualified audit opinion and 0 otherwise. LQ (lagged Q) is the auditor opinion 
in the prior year.  AR is accounts receivable deflated by total assets.  ORECTA is as 
defined earlier. Panel B examines the effect of a qualified audit opinion on subsequent 
tunneling behavior. We regress ORECTA in year t+1 on current ORECTA, dummy 
variable Q, and other control variables.  All regressions include firm and year fixed 
effects. 
 
Panel A: LOGIT Estimate of the Probability of Receiving an Qualified Opinion 
  Model 1   Model 2  
 Coefficient Chi-Sq P-value Coefficient Chi-Sq P-value 
INTERCEPT -2.337  4.413  0.036  -3.982  11.165  0.001  
ORECTA 6.846  287.892 <.0001 6.489  222.586  <.0001 
LQ    0.968  81.746  <.0001 
ROA -10.234  184.921 <.0001 -9.929  157.289  <.0001 
LEV 2.190  59.884 <.0001 1.862  38.528  <.0001 
SIZE -0.045  0.685  0.408  0.022  0.140  0.709  
NONOPERAT 7.895  3.683  0.055  3.696  0.742  0.389  
AR -0.056  0.014  0.907  0.661  1.689  0.194  
 
OBS: 6,378       
Psudo R-square 31.57%   38.43%   
 
 
Panel B: The Effect of a Qualified Opinion on Subsequent Tunneling Behavior 
(Dependent variable is ORECTA in year t+1) 
 
 Coefficients T-statistics P-value 
ORECTA 0.333  20.940 <.0001 
Q 0.049  3.010  0.003  
LEV 0.013  1.330  0.183  
SIZE 0.015  5.240  <.0001 
 
OBS: 6378    
ADJ-R2: 70.02%    
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Figure 1.  The Time-series Behavior of ORECTA 
 
Between 1996 and 2004, in each year (t) we sort firms into ten deciles based on Other 
receivable as a percentage of total assets (ORECTA).  From the lowest ORECTA decile 
to the highest, each decile is assigned a ranking from 0 to 9. We then trace the level 
(Figure 1A) and the rankings (Figure 1B) of ORECTA in each decile for the future three 
years.  
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Figure 2.  The Proportion of Firms in each ORECTA Decile that attains ST 
(Special Treatment) status in two years 
Chinese listed firms that have had two consecutive annual losses (or whose book value 
becomes negative) receive “Special treatment" or "ST” status.  ST stocks are under 
various trading and financial restrictions, and if an ST stock reports one more loss year, it 
will be delisted.  Because Chinese firms rarely go bankrupt, ST can be regarded as an 
equivalent financial distress metric.   
 
Between 1996 and 2004, we sort firms annually into ten deciles based on the magnitude 
of their reported ORECTA (other receivables as a percentage of total assets). This figure 
depicts the proportion of firms in each decile that received ST status two years after the 
formation of the deciles. That is, we form the portfolios in year t, and observe whether 
this firm is specially treated in year t+3. 
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Figure 3.  The Relation between BLOCK and ORECTA 
 
This graph examines the relation between ownership structure and the extent of tunneling using 
ORECTA.  Prior literature suggests that the incentives for tunneling will be most acute when a 
blockholder’s cashflow ownership (C) is much lower than her controlling ownership (O). To test this 
hypothesis, we sort firms annually into 10 deciles based on BLOCK, the percentage of common shares 
held by the biggest shareholder (a proxy for C). We then compute the median ORECTA in each decile 
(the line graph), as well as the average BLOCK value (the bar graph). The X-axis is decile rankings 
based on BLOCK.  Numerical values for BLOCK are reported in the left side of the graph; numerical 
values for ORECTA are reported on the right. 
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Figure 4: The Relation between ORECTA and the Probability of Firms Receiving an 
Unclean Auditor Opinion 
 
Each year, firms are sorted into ten deciles based on ORECTA. We then calculate the 
percentage of firms within each group that received a qualified opinion in the 
accompanying audit report.  
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